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The United States–China Economic and Security Review Commission con-
vened a daylong hearing on the global power-projection capabilities of the 
People’s Liberation Army (PLA) on 20 February 2020. What follows is a ver-
sion of the testimony with which the author responded to the commission’s 
questions on Chinese bases and access points, drawing on an original data set 
of the ninety-five overseas port terminals that Chinese firms—primarily three 
entities, two of which are central state–owned enterprises—own, operate, or 
both.1 These facilities are concentrated in the Indian Ocean and eastern Medi-
terranean Sea.
Some of the terminals in this expanding commercial network may serve dual-
use functions as “strategic strongpoints” for the PLA to sustain overseas military 
operations of increasing complexity and duration. This strongpoint model is 
not suited for supporting high-end combat; rather, it is optimized for peace-
time logistics and intelligence collection. Domestically, efforts are under way to 
achieve greater “military-civilian fusion,” such that PLA forces can use terminals 
operated by Chinese firms more readily. Internationally, the PLA Navy (PLAN) 
engages in military diplomacy that advances the 
political relationships between China and host 
countries, including by conducting port calls at 
facilities owned and operated by Chinese firms.
The testimony concludes with analysis of 
Chinese firms’ terminals in the United States and 
several recommendations for U.S. policy makers 
to understand and mitigate security risks from 
China’s overseas port expansion.
RESEARCH & DEBATE
PIER COMPETITOR TESTIMONY ON CHINA’S GLOBAL PORTS
Isaac Kardon
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RESEARCH & DEBATE
PIER COMPETITOR TESTIMONY ON CHINA’S GLOBAL PORTS
Isaac Kardon
Where and how is China securing bases and other access points to facilitate its 
expeditionary capabilities?
The PLA’s air- and sealift capabilities remain insufficient to supply and sustain 
complex military operations beyond the range of mainland logistics networks. 
Yet, with the notable exception of the sole military “support base” in Djibouti, 
these limited vessels and aircraft are the PLA’s only organic mode of “strategic de-
livery” to project military power overseas.2 Lacking a network of overseas bases, 
the PLA must rely on a variety of commercial access points to operate beyond the 
first island chain. Because the PLAN is the service branch to which virtually all 
these missions fall, this testimony focuses on port facilities.
The PLAN depends on commercial ports to support its growing operations 
overseas. Over the course of deploying thirty-five escort task forces since 2008 
to perform an antipiracy mission in the Gulf of Aden, the PLAN has developed 
a pattern of procuring commercial husbanding services for fuel and supplies at 
hundreds of ports across the globe. All navies that operate abroad rely to some 
degree on such routine commercial arrangements. The distinctive aspect of the 
PLAN’s efforts to support a growing overseas presence, however, is its access to 
a large and growing number of ports (partly) owned and operated by People’s 
Republic of China (PRC) firms. PLA officers and Chinese analysts tout a variety 
of possible dual-use functions at these ports, which in some cases are dubbed 
China’s overseas “strategic strongpoints.”3
How does the PLAN use these facilities; where are the facilities located; who 
owns and operates them; and what, if any, military purposes do they serve? After 
summarizing the pattern of commercial activity, we will turn to the potential 
dual-use functions of Chinese-owned and -operated ports and the prospects for 
securing actual military bases.
China’s Global Port Portfolio
Since the late 1990s, a handful of Chinese firms have seized considerable market 
share as international terminal operators. They have leveraged capital and exper-
tise drawn from the extraordinary scale of China’s own domestic port industry 
(which boasts thirty-one of the world’s top fifty ports by total cargo tonnage, and 
seven of the top ten highest-throughput containerports) to expand overseas.4 As 
of July 2020, PRC firms (partly) owned or operated some ninety-five ports across 
the globe.5 At a far larger number of ports—on the order of hundreds—Chinese 
firms have built port works, upgraded equipment, or dredged harbors.6 However, 
such contracted projects do not leave a Chinese firm in control of the manage-
ment or operations of the port, and thus are excluded from analysis here of how 
Chinese commercial facilities may support military operations.
Ownership is a major factor in unlocking dual-use potential. Of the ninety-five 
Chinese-operated/owned ports abroad, central state–owned enterprises (SOEs) 
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have operational roles, ownership stakes, or both in fifty-two of them, and eight 
involve local SOEs but no central SOEs.7 In thirty-five of the Chinese-operated/
owned overseas ports, private firms have ownership stakes or operational roles 
and no SOEs are present. A Chinese firm is the majority shareholder in at least 
one terminal at fifty-six ports, and the 100 percent shareholder in twenty-three 
of those.
Of China’s overseas port operations, 81 percent (seventy-seven of ninety-five) 
are accounted for by three Chinese firms: Hutchison Ports (Hutchison), COSCO 
Shipping Ports (COSCO), and China Merchants Port (CMPort). Each is a subsid-
iary of a larger enterprise group, with COSCO and CMPort answering to a central 
SOE led by an executive with vice-ministerial rank in government. Hutchison is 
a majority shareholder in thirty-six of its thirty-eight ports, including twenty in 
which it holds 100 percent stakes. COSCO holds majority stakes in seven of its 
nineteen overseas ports. CMPort holds majority stakes in three of its thirty-three 
overseas terminals; in twenty-nine of CMPort’s terminals it maintains a minority 
partnership through a joint venture (with the French firm CMA CGM) in which 
CMPort has no managerial or operational role, only portfolio investment and 
board representation.8
The geography of these firms’ holdings is represented in the figure. By ocean, 
there are thirty-one in the Atlantic, twenty-five in the Indian Ocean, twenty-one 
in the Pacific, and sixteen in the Mediterranean. Regionally, there are twenty-two 
in Europe, twenty in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), eighteen in the 
Americas, eighteen in South and Southeast Asia, and nine in sub-Saharan Africa. 
Fifty-three of these ports are located proximate to key maritime choke points. Of 
these, ten are near the English Channel, nine are near the Malacca Strait, nine are 
near the Strait of Hormuz, six are near the Suez Canal, and four each are near the 
Panama Canal, the Gibraltar Strait, and the Turkish straits.9
Analysis
The “where” of prospective PLAN access points basically can be read off a map 
such as the figure. That spatial representation reveals more about the distribution 
than does a simple count of ports. While a plurality of China’s overseas ports are 
on the Atlantic, their wide geographic dispersion (ten in the western Atlantic, ten 
in the eastern Atlantic, eleven in the northern Atlantic) makes that accounting 
misleading. But because the Atlantic ports lie across the ocean on different con-
tinents, the western Indian Ocean region, or MENA, should be considered the 
area of greatest concentration—and especially so if we include the seven ports on 
the eastern Mediterranean, which serve vital roles for traffic moving through the 
Suez Canal into or out of the Indian Ocean. South and Southeast Asia also host 
concentrations of Chinese ports at key locations along major sea lines of com-
munication (SLOCs) and proximate to critical choke points.
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The “how” of securing control over the operations of a port and using it is more 
complex. China’s lack of alliances means that there are no standing legal com-
mitments for military use (with the exception of Djibouti), and each such access 
agreement will be negotiated ad hoc—and likely out of public view.10 The fact pat-
tern above shows a significant incidence of Chinese SOE ownership and operation 
at foreign port facilities, concentrated in a small handful of firms. On its face, this 
suggests the potential for a high degree of coordination between firms and the 
military for use of a network of commercial port facilities. This assumption bears 
further scrutiny, though, as there are several other characteristics of port opera-
tions that may be more decisive than corporate ownership. There also are a large 
number of ports in countries in which the PLA is unlikely to enjoy the political 
favor of the host government. Analysis of these characteristics allows us to win-
now down the list to a handful of ports that should be considered most likely can-
didates for fuller dual-use development as PLAN access points in critical regions.
The dominance of the political over the commercial in firm behavior cannot 
be assumed on the basis of ownership.11 More significant than corporate owner-
ship is the degree to which the firm itself controls the operations of the port, 
the physical capacity of the port to supply naval vessels, the specific conditions 
of the concession from the local port authority (e.g., lease term, responsibilities 
of various partners to a venture), and the nature and scope of China’s broader 
diplomatic and economic relations with the host country. In general, a terminal 
operator will have significant discretion in granting access to naval vessels seek-
ing to call, warehousing and storage, and bunkering, as well as use of dry dock, 
medical, power, and other terminal facilities. Majority or sole ownership of the 
port operator is the condition that best positions a firm to guarantee logistical 
CHINESE FIRMS’ GLOBAL PORT PORTFOLIO
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support for naval operations. Such arrangements are more feasible in friendly 
countries in which low transparency is the norm in contracting (and governance 
generally) and where China accounts for a large proportion of their overall trade 
and investment.
Considering these factors at the firm level helps narrow the field. Of the major 
firms involved, Hutchison is a relatively unlikely candidate to make its ports ac-
cessible to the PLA. Of the fifty-six majority stakes Chinese firms hold, Hutchi-
son holds thirty-six, including twenty of the twenty-three ports where a Chinese 
firm has sole ownership of a terminal. Nearly half its holdings are in advanced 
industrial democracies and tend to be single terminals within much larger port 
complexes. This private firm’s senior management is from Hong Kong, Europe, 
and Latin America and the company is incorporated in the Cayman Islands 
(with subsidiaries scattered across other jurisdictions, including the British 
Virgin Islands and Singapore). Its major operations can be found in the United 
Kingdom, the Netherlands, and Mexico, but it also operates several ports in and 
around the Persian Gulf (the United Arab Emirates [UAE], Iraq, Saudi Arabia, 
and Pakistan), the eastern Mediterranean (Egypt), the Panama Canal, and East 
Africa (Tanzania) in which it holds majority or total ownership of one or more 
terminals. Hutchison’s political and geographic distance from Beijing makes it 
a less likely candidate for the deep cooperation required to establish dual-use 
functions.12 Its governance is more transparent than that of SOEs. Diversion of 
corporate resources toward noneconomic purposes likely would meet internal 
resistance and invite external scrutiny.
By contrast, COSCO is a central SOE that formerly was controlled directly by 
the PRC Ministry of Transport as the sole domestic and international shipping 
operator in China. It has undergone several rounds of corporate transformation 
and mergers to become a global transport and logistics behemoth.13 Its terminal-
operating subsidiary, COSCO Shipping Ports, has taken a variety of notable posi-
tions in foreign ports, including majority control of the port authority at Piraeus, 
Greece, with a 100 percent ownership of development and operations at two of 
that port’s terminals. Other notable projects include COSCO’s first international 
greenfield port development, a 90 percent stake in the Khalifa port in Abu Dhabi, 
UAE, to set up the largest freight station in the Middle East; a second greenfield 
investment, at Puerto Chancay in Peru, is also a majority stake (60 percent). 
COSCO’s notable lack of transparency and appetite for loss-making ventures 
owing to heavy subsidization and support from Beijing make it a most-likely 
candidate for facilitating military use of its port facilities—and also its shipping, 
container, and general logistics capacity.14
CMPort is also a central SOE, but with a political reputation and corpo-
rate strategy quite different from COSCO’s. Firm representatives and industry 
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executives note its independent origins as a Hong Kong trading house founded 
during the “self-strengthening movement” in opposition to British occupation, 
and have taken somewhat more conservative positions in overseas ports (with 
major exceptions at Hambantota and Djibouti).15 The bulk of CMPort’s overseas 
ports (twenty-nine of thirty-three) are in fact portfolio investments—that is, 
minority stakes in a joint venture with the French firm CMA CGM’s terminal-
operating subsidiary Terminal Link, in which CMPort has no operational or 
managerial role.16 CMPort has sought to distinguish itself with slick marketing 
and appeals to foreign investors on the strength of its “Shekou Model” for com-
prehensive development of a port site into a trade-and-commerce hub, drawing 
attention to its corporate strategy from the likes of Wharton and Harvard Busi-
ness School.17 The firm’s executives are media-savvy (at least compared with 
COSCO’s) promoters who traffic in business jargon and explain their firm’s 
interests as maximizing “synergies” with “exposure to major trade flows and key 
resources.”18
However, CMPort operates the port adjacent to the Djibouti base, where it 
regularly has devoted commercial pier space to PLAN surface combatants.19 
The comprehensive commercial ecosystem prescribed in its Shekou Model also 
establishes a large and diverse Chinese commercial presence, including ashore 
transport, logistics, industrial, and communications facilities. While less easily 
persuaded to crowd out its commercial business than COSCO or local SOEs, 
CMPort is demonstrably willing to coordinate with the PLAN and has pursued 
some projects in strategic areas despite their dubious commercial prospects 
(Hambantota, in Sri Lanka, stands out on this count).
Beyond those “big three” players, other PRC firms operate or own only a 
small handful of ports worthy of close scrutiny. China Overseas Port Holding 
Company is a state-owned firm that is the sole owner and operator of the Paki-
stani port of Gwadar. According to its chairman, Zhang Baozhong, the firm was 
“specially designed and purposely built for the construction of the Gwadar Port 
by the Chinese government.”20 One unnamed PLA officer reportedly said of 
China’s military use of Gwadar as a base that “the food is already on the plate, 
we’ll eat it whenever we want to.”21 Pakistan stands out as a country where China’s 
extraordinarily close political, military, and economic ties make it a prime can-
didate for expansion of PLAN operations. Provincial SOEs Guangxi Beibu Gulf 
International Port Group and Tianjin Union Development Group are developing 
port projects in Cambodia under an unusual land lease, and construction of a 
military-grade airfield and reported PLA activity in the area have raised hack-
les.22 Cambodia, like Pakistan and North Korea, is among the countries most 
likely to cooperate in nonpublic ways with the PRC to provide reliable military 
access to the PLA.
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For the PLA to use any of these ports meaningfully, however, lines of commu-
nication and authorities for military appropriation of civilian facilities need to be 
established. This prompts the next question addressed in this testimony.
How do policies such as “military-civil fusion” and laws and regulations such as 
China’s 2017 National Defense Transportation Law improve the PLA’s expedition-
ary and force-projection capabilities?
Beijing’s energetic promotion of “military-civil fusion” has created wide av-
enues for cooperation between the PLA and industry.23 Among the significant 
elements of this program for the military use of commercial port facilities are 
a series of reforms, as well as laws and regulations obligating firms to prepare 
actively for and accommodate military requests. A National Defense Mobiliza-
tion Law, a National Defense Transportation Law, and two newly formed and 
upgraded organs under the Central Military Commission (CMC)—the National 
Defense Mobilization Department and the Logistics Support Department, cre-
ated in a major round of PLA reforms in 2016—stand out as key indications of 
the desired trajectory of more-integrated dual-use capabilities.24 Central policy 
is driving toward a more substantial role for the military and the state in defining 
the conditions under which civilian assets and resources are employed.25
The mobilization law guarantees fiscal reimbursement to central and local 
budgets (art. 6) and further promises untold “rewards for citizens and organiza-
tions that have made outstanding contributions in national defense mobiliza-
tion” (art. 7). Certain key construction projects, designated jointly by the State 
Council and CMC (art. 22), are to be built to military standards (art. 23), with 
the benefit of “subsidies or other preferential policies” (art. 24).26 While the 
implementation of the law is left to lower-level authorities, the mandate is clear: 
“any organization or individual has the obligation to accept the expropriation of 
civil resources in accordance with the law” (art. 55).27 The mobilization law also 
establishes a system for maintaining and transferring “strategic material reserves” 
from enterprises to the military (arts. 33–36). While administrative regulations 
are left to local military and civilian authorities (notably, the Transportation War 
Readiness Offices at the provincial level), those organs may task the enterprises 
with storing military supplies at overseas facilities. The prerogative to use civil 
transportation capacity—including port facilities, airports, rails, and roads—is 
granted expressly under standing defense-mobilization regulations issued by the 
CMC and State Council.28
Under what circumstances will enterprises have the capacity and willingness 
to build and maintain facilities, equipment, and supplies to military standards, 
which diverts resources and space that otherwise might have commercial value? 
These considerations are closely held, so observable evidence of participation in 
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other military-civilian fusion programs is probably the best indicator. COSCO 
and CMPort containerships and roll-on/roll-off (RO/RO) vessels have par-
ticipated in a number of military-civilian exercises, including transport of live 
ammunition and use of RO/RO vessels built to military specifications, so there 
is a basis for expecting cooperation on other matters.29 Making this integration 
systematic and reliable in the event of domestic crisis, however, is a challenge. A 
foreign crisis would involve greater difficulty, by orders of magnitude, requiring 
the Chinese companies to overcome both distance and the acute political sen-
sitivities of a host country that likely will prefer not to be drawn into a conflict.
PLA analysts have studied aspects of this problem of integration and have 
flagged various issues concerning the suitability of commercial facilities for mili-
tary use.30 One 2019 study written by a member of the joint staff of the Eastern 
Theater Command with academics from the Army Transportation Academy 
and Tsinghua University argues that the relevant national-defense requirements 
have not been implemented properly for port construction. Enterprises need to 
build “combat-ready terminals,” with RO/RO berths built to a higher standard 
than those for passenger automobiles, and ensure a ten-meter minimum depth 
in berths; create assembly sites, storage facilities greater than 120,000 square me-
ters, and cold-chain storage for overseas replenishment; and build high-quality 
roads serving the port that can bear heavy equipment.31 Commercial demand for 
these facilities is low, so better “top-level design” and subsidies are necessary for 
enterprises to properly construct ports—even domestically—that can support 
military use.32
Military analysts from the PLA Navy Service College in Tianjin have at-
tempted to model out how commercial cargo terminals can be used to provide 
emergency fuel and material support for the PLAN. Accepting that commercial 
piers and refueling facilities typically are not built to military standards, they 
address the complex protocol that would be required to conduct refueling safely 
using local power, fuel supplies, and military refueling vehicles that can provide 
the correct types and quantities of petroleum, oil, and lubricants for the varied 
classes of PLAN ships. In modeling processes for emergency wartime refueling 
at civilian piers, the paper tries to “accurately predict the emergency fuel support 
process that is in line with wartime naval vessels using civil port cargo terminals, 
fuel-equipment types, and quantity requirements to meet the number of ships 
and refueling flow requirements.”33 This effort seeks only to model one replen-
ishment prior to the arrival of supply ships and tankers, not the sustained access 
to secure fuel and supplies that would be required in a protracted conflict. The 
degree of difficulty here should be taken as evidence of a recognition within the 
PLAN that the service requires a more reliable way to ensure adequate support 
for combat vessels than emergency use of nonspecialized commercial ports.
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The transaction for sourcing and procuring materials also is at issue. Authors 
from the Naval University of Engineering in Wuhan note that “since central 
state–owned enterprises’ main responsibility is certainly not replenishing the 
Chinese military overseas, procurement channels are limited,” which will lead to 
high costs and unsteady supply. They argue that options should be explored such 
that adequate “wartime pre-positioned materials” can be brought to the fight. 
They propose three such options: (1) the PLA operating overseas bases directly, 
(2) the PLA cooperating with Chinese companies already engaged commercially 
in the local economy, and (3) the PLA dealing directly with local governments to 
rent space and procure necessary supplies.34
However desirable such an extensive network of bases might be to PLA opera-
tors, one is not going to materialize in the near future.35 Therefore, the practical 
questions concern how to get the right supplies on time and at manageable prices. 
One article in the PLAN’s official newspaper estimated that it took over twenty 
days to execute a purchase of supplies overseas, giving rise to an “emergency 
foreign purchase plan” that permitted the task force commander to make the pur-
chase directly from a Chinese firm within two days.36 PLA logistics officers argue 
that civilian firms’ organic capabilities far exceed the PLA’s own, and that port calls 
to their facilities “provide a platform for the military to rely on corporate strengths, 
. . . use market economic means, and adopt commercial contract entrustment 
methods to give full play to the advantages of enterprises and realize resource 
sharing.”37 Whether these savings will be achieved because of “sweetheart” deals, 
longer-term wholesale contracts, or outright expropriation is unclear.
From an operational effectiveness standpoint, the PLA would much prefer to 
operate its own dedicated facilities. For broader political reasons, however, the 
opportunity costs of overtly militarizing facilities likely will continue to make this 
option less attractive to civilian leadership—especially when commercial firms 
can service the PLA’s various functional needs adequately.38 The military-civilian 
fusion program reflects and advances a clear leadership preference for leveraging 
growing overseas PRC commercial capacity.
Given the expected costs of militarizing commercial facilities, Chinese strate-
gists have debated actively the highest-value locations for establishing access 
points for the PLAN. While the host country certainly gets a vote, prior to that 
Beijing must prioritize certain projects. These considerations lead to the next 
question.
What does China regard as the most important criteria for selecting future bases 
and access points for the PLA?
A burgeoning literature by Chinese military and civilian analysts on securing 
access to overseas bases and places provides insight into the several criteria that 
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make for desirable overseas bases and access points. Most of these criteria are 
intuitive and of long standing: geographic proximity to perceived security threats; 
hosting by friendly, stable countries; suitable natural conditions at the port (e.g., 
wide approach channels, deep harbors, unthreatening climate); and capability for 
adequate force protection.39 An additional, more recent factor, based on the com-
mercial developments addressed above, is the advantage offered by the presence 
of Chinese enterprises on or near the site.40
Naturally, geostrategic considerations are paramount. China’s armed forces 
seek to build the capability to defend vulnerable SLOCs, especially at key choke 
points.41 The authoritative PLA Academy of Military Science’s 2013 Science of 
Military Strategy states as follows:
[W]e must build overseas strategic strongpoints that depend on the homeland, 
radiate into the periphery, and move us in the direction of the two oceans [i.e., the 
Pacific and Indian Oceans]. These sites are to provide support for overseas military 
operations or act as a forward base for deploying military forces overseas, exerting 
political and military influence in relevant regions. We should form a posture with 
the homeland strategic layout that takes account of both the interior and the exterior, 
connects the near with the far, and provides mutual support.42
A staff officer and an academic from the PLA Navy Submarine Academy in Qing-
dao further posit that “[t]he line stretching from the Taiwan Strait through the 
South China Sea, Malacca Strait, Indian Ocean, and the Arabian Sea is China’s 
‘maritime lifeline.’”43 Most analysts focus on this vulnerable lifeline and propose 
strategic strongpoints stretching across the Indian Ocean region, such that supply 
intervals between them are short enough to make one or more ports redundant 
in a crisis.44
Some analysts are willing to make concrete recommendations about preferred 
locations. Academics at the Army Transportation Academy propose that “to 
protect our ever-growing overseas interests, we will progressively establish a lo-
gistics network in Pakistan, United Arab Emirates, Sri Lanka, Burma, Singapore, 
Indonesia, Kenya, and other countries based on various means—buying, renting, 
cooperating—to construct our overseas bases or overseas support strongpoints.”45 
A group of researchers from the PLA Naval Research Institute propose that China 
needs to establish at least one strategic strongpoint in the Bay of Bengal, one in 
the Persian Gulf region, and one in the Suez–Red Sea–Gulf of Aden region. They 
suggest Sittwe in Burma, Gwadar in Pakistan, and Djibouti or the Seychelles, 
respectively.46 They argue that these are defensive positions to check India, but 
that a way to “further influence the entire Indian Ocean route and the African 
continent” would be to establish locations at Hambantota in Sri Lanka or Dar 
es Salaam in Tanzania. An Academy of Military Science analyst also is specific 
about locations, but strikes a more cautious note. “India is extremely sensitive 
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about China-Pakistan cooperation. Despite the fact that China has repeatedly 
emphasized that Gwadar port is a civilian project, India has long suspected that 
China will someday build Gwadar port into a military base.”47 Other proposed 
locations surrounding India (e.g., the Maldives, the Seychelles, Bangladesh) pose 
similar geopolitical problems for China in terms of balancing responses from 
India, Japan, and the United States.48
Some analysts argue that military access should adhere more closely to eco-
nomic development–focused PRC foreign policy. The “key nodes” should be 
“places where the flows of people, logistics, capital, and information are highly 
concentrated. . . . Reasonably determining and accelerating the construction of 
key nodes along strategic channels is of great practical significance . . . for im-
proving our military’s strategic delivery capability.”49 Authoritative sources fur-
ther stress the importance of noncombat military operations to protect Chinese 
citizens from terrorism, unrest, and natural disasters.50 This logic puts “trade be-
fore the flag” in suggesting that points suitable for military support should be de-
termined by first-order considerations of securing China’s commercial interests.
Still, both a geoeconomic and a geostrategic set of criteria dictate that various 
ports between Suez and the South China Sea should be priorities for military 
access; points farther afield are less attractive from either standpoint. Yet oppor-
tunism is a powerful motivation, and the chance to establish more-substantial 
military access to a commercial port off the major strategic SLOCs—in, say, the 
Gulf of Guinea or the South Pacific—also yields a certain operational logic. In 
addition to providing capacity to operate in distant theaters, such off-center sites 
might trigger less-aggressive balancing from the United States, India, and Japan 
than would a Chinese base in Sri Lanka or Pakistan.
How does China use military diplomacy, foreign assistance, military training, and 
military sales to secure agreements with other countries to provide the PLA with 
basing and other access rights?
PLA interactions with foreign governments and militaries are an important 
component of China’s overall foreign policy.51 China’s military diplomacy has 
provided ample opportunities for PLAN units to call at ports owned or operated 
by PRC firms. PLAN vessels (including the hospital ship Peace Ark) have visited 
at least thirty-one of those ninety-five sites.52 Such visits are likely a prerequisite 
to more-significant military use, and might be used to familiarize PLAN of-
ficers and crews with the facilities and firm personnel operating the Chinese 
terminals.
Notably, though, at fifty-seven of the ninety-five PRC ports overseas, the 
PLAN has called at a different port in the same country, forgoing the oppor-
tunity to call at a terminal owned and operated by a PRC firm. In thirty-six 
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of those fifty-seven forgone port calls, PRC firms held a majority share in a 
terminal operation. While some of those facilities are not ideally suited for a 
PLAN call, virtually any facility has at least rudimentary capacity to support a 
naval ship. If the facility were being prepared for more-substantial naval use, 
the PLAN likely would have opted to visit the Chinese-owned and -operated 
terminal. This observation implies that diplomatic rather than operational 
factors are determinative. China either defers to the host country’s preferences 
or seeks to downplay the military implications of its commercial enterprises’ 
presence in the country, or both. That being the case, the data do not establish a 
definite link between PLA visits and the establishment of bases or access points. 
Conversely, bases and access points cannot be reliably established in advance of 
a PLA visit to the site. Therefore, while observing and analyzing such visits is 
a valuable exercise, it cannot predict definitively an intent to militarize a com-
mercial facility.
Other components of military diplomacy, such as foreign assistance, military 
sales, and military training or education, are consequential for forging relation-
ships conducive to allowing Chinese military access to ports on foreign shores. 
Increasingly, senior-level leadership interactions and training are undertaken 
“off-site,” in mainland China.53 Although foreign students report having very lit-
tle interaction with their PLA counterparts (except with instructors in the class-
room), this combined educational programming establishes personal ties among 
senior officers and forges institutional links between militaries.54 Functional 
exchanges on specialized subjects such as logistics and military medicine also are 
a part of the PLA’s outreach package to foreign militaries. These opportunities, 
like training and education, allow China to showcase its growing capabilities, 
confidence, and professionalism—a valuable impression to leave with foreign 
militaries that may consider affording greater access to a powerful PLA deemed 
capable of benefiting their own national security.
Arms sales, typically paired with other military diplomacy, offer material ben-
efits that can serve as further inducement for a foreign country to be receptive to 
PLA access. Such sales are concentrated disproportionately among South Asian 
states; Pakistan, Burma, and Bangladesh were the top three recipients of Chinese 
arms in the period 2008–18, together accounting for 61 percent of PRC arms 
transfers.55 Given the growing sophistication of some of these exports (such as 
submarines, surface combatants, and unmanned aerial vehicles), they also invite 
ongoing Chinese technical assistance.56 China’s sale of two Ming-class Type 035B 
diesel-electric submarines to Bangladesh illustrates this process. While these 
affordable but obsolete submarines were not capable platforms, they came pack-
aged with Chinese personnel to “supervise the construction” as well as PLAN 
crews to train the Bangladeshi submariners.57 PLAN vessels began calling in 
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Bangladesh in 2016 once the submarines were delivered, and by 2019 Bangladesh 
was negotiating with China to build it a submarine base—although it expressly 
denied that the PLA would use the facility.58
China’s military diplomacy repertoire has grown, and the PLA’s increasing 
capability presents China as a more attractive partner to many states. Yet to date, 
only Djibouti has provided anything recognizable as a secure basing arrange-
ment. This is not necessarily a sign of the failure of the program but rather an 
indicator of its more incremental and unpublicized nature. According to one re-
searcher at the Academy of Military Science’s Foreign Military Studies Institute, it 
may be the establishment of commercial access that leads to military diplomacy. 
“Military diplomacy must obey and serve overall national diplomacy. Therefore, 
in the process of building strategic strongpoints China should not overemphasize 
the role of military diplomacy. Military diplomacy should play a supporting role. 
Moreover, it should place civil affairs and economics front and center. It should 
mix the military among the civilians to conceal the military.”59 Observation of 
military diplomacy, especially PLAN port calls, may then be a lagging indicator 
of the practical military support afforded by China’s growing portfolio of overseas 
ports.
A final consideration concerns Chinese firms’ holdings in the United States.
Please describe Chinese state-owned enterprises’ investments in U.S. ports; the ratio-
nale behind choosing those particular ports; and how U.S. policy makers can assess 
whether Chinese investments in such ports pose security risks to the United States.
Chinese state-owned enterprises hold ownership stakes in terminals at five 
U.S. ports. COSCO has established joint ventures at Long Beach, Los Angeles, 
and Seattle, and CMPort holds a minority stake in a French firm’s terminals 
at Miami and Houston. Neither PRC firm wholly owns or directly operates an 
American terminal. In contrast to the strategic strongpoint approach to develop-
ing dual-use port facilities in the Indian Ocean, Chinese port investment in the 
United States appears to be commercially driven. Augmented U.S. restrictions 
on foreign investment in critical infrastructure diminish plausible risks posed 
by such investment. In particular, robust enforcement of the new Foreign Invest-
ment Risk Review Modernization Act (FIRRMA) by the Committee on Foreign 
Investment in the United States (CFIUS) will diminish further the control a Chi-
nese firm can have over a U.S. port asset, and thus limit such investments from 
posing acute national-security risks.
COSCO
COSCO was the earliest Chinese SOE player in the U.S. maritime sector, begin-
ning cargo shipments shortly after normalization in 1979 and gradually establish-
ing a shipping presence at West Coast ports.60 As the scale of U.S.-China trade 
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increased in the 1990s, COSCO sought a commercial foothold in its biggest 
market, in part by establishing its own terminal. In November 1996, the City of 
Long Beach and COSCO signed a lease for the abandoned Long Beach Naval Sta-
tion to develop and operate it as a cargo port. After public objections, including 
from Congress, the city canceled the lease in April 1997. A subsequent CFIUS 
review of the deal did not find national-security risks, but further congressional 
action ensured that COSCO would not be eligible to use any closed U.S. military 
facilities.61 COSCO subsequently established joint ventures to operate at three 
terminals on the West Coast.
COSCO at Long Beach, Pier J (Pacific Container Terminal). By 2001, COSCO 
had moved on to form a joint venture with Seattle-based Stevedoring Services of 
America (SSA). Together they took over a lease vacated by the Danish shipping 
and logistics firm Maersk. Their joint venture, Pacific Maritime Services LLC, is a 
private, Delaware-registered corporation that operates the Pacific Container Ter-
minal at Pier J in Long Beach. COSCO is the majority shareholder (51 percent, 
through its New Jersey–based subsidiary COSCO Terminals America, Inc.), but 
decisions by the corporate board require an “affirmative vote of at least 70 per-
cent of the ownership shares of the members,” meaning COSCO does not have 
an effective majority. SSA operates the terminal itself, with COSCO providing 
cargo and shipping services.62 COSCO’s huge volumes of cargo and aggressively 
low pricing tend to distinguish it from rival firms, and make it a valued tenant at 
Long Beach.63
COSCO at Los Angeles, West Basin Container Terminal. Also in 2001, China 
Shipping Group (which merged with COSCO in 2016) entered a joint venture 
with the Taiwanese shipping and logistics firm Yang Ming.64 China Shipping /
COSCO owns 40 percent of the joint venture to operate the West Basin Container 
Terminal (Yang Ming owns 40 percent and Ports America later bought the other 
20 percent). China Shipping operates three of the fourteen berths at the terminal; 
Yang Ming operates the rest, with Ports America providing stevedoring servic-
es.65 Xi Jinping visited a China Shipping berth (number 100) at the terminal in 
February 2012 (when he was PRC vice president), accompanied by California 
governor Jerry Brown and Los Angeles mayor Antonio Villaraigosa. On site, Xi 
praised the terminal’s role in facilitating huge volumes of Sino-U.S. trade, lauded 
the contributions of Chinese firms to U.S. employment and tax revenues, and 
called attention to the terminal’s use of clean energy.66 At the time, an expansion 
of the terminal was entering its final stages after encountering lawsuits over its 
environmental impact and practices. The terminal was built, but controversy per-
sists today, with new mitigation measures demanded owing to the Chinese firm’s 
“languishing compliance” with emissions regulations.67
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COSCO at Seattle, Terminal 30. Two COSCO subsidiaries hold a collective 33.33 
percent stake in Terminal 30 at the Port of Seattle in a joint venture in place since 
2007.68 As in Long Beach, SSA is the operator, and COSCO’s role as a minority 
shareholder is to drive cargo traffic through the terminal. Officials at the North-
west Seaport Alliance (the port authority for Seattle and Tacoma ports) describe 
COSCO’s massive cargo volumes in glowing terms, viewing the firm as a reliable 
and influential client.69
China Merchants Port
China Merchants Port arrived in the U.S. market considerably later, in 2013 ac-
quiring 49 percent of the public shares in Terminal Link, the terminal-operating 
subsidiary of the French firm CMA CGM.70 According to industry profession-
als, CMA CGM was cash poor and cargo rich, while CMPort was the reverse 
and looking to diversify away from squeezed margins resulting from increasing 
labor costs at its Chinese terminals.71 CMPort in 2013 had substantial cash 
holdings and cash flow from its port operations in China.72 CMPort thus was 
able to offer CMA CGM much-needed capital, as well as favorable financing for 
shipbuilding, distinguishing its bid from that of a Japanese consortium also in-
terested in acquiring stakes in Terminal Link.73 CMPort sought access to global 
markets and made a portfolio investment in a firm that held stakes (mostly 
Xi Jinping visits COSCO’s West Basin Container Terminal, in Los Angeles.
Source: David Starkopf / Office of Mayor Antonio R. Villaraigosa, Xi Jinping Visit–1, https://www.flickr.com/photos/37176081@N02/6922069517/, 
licensed under CC BY-NC 2.0, creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/2.0/.
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minority) in fifteen terminals scattered around Europe, Africa, North America, 
and Asia.74 This same commercial logic drove an additional CMPort investment, 
in the form of a one-billion-dollar loan to CMA CGM that secured 49 percent 
ownership of Terminal Link’s stakes in an additional ten ports across the globe 
in December 2019.75
Under the terms of the share acquisition, Terminal Link remains in charge of 
management and operations and appoints four of the seven board members.76 
With a minority position on the board and no CMPort managers involved in the 
terminals, the firm is an equity investor—an associate, not an operating part-
ner—at the two U.S. ports in the Terminal Link portfolio. One industry execu-
tive described the Chinese role in Terminal Link as being contentious at first, as 
CMPort sought more say in corporate governance, but indicated that the firm’s 
presence now is limited to “a couple of China Merchants marketing executives in 
Marseille” (the Terminal Link headquarters).77
CMPort at Houston (Bayport). The Bayport terminal is a joint venture between 
Terminal Link Texas (51 percent) and Ports America (49 percent), meaning that 
the CMPort equity stake in the entity is 25 percent. The facility handles tankers 
and a large portion of the containerized cargo in the Gulf of Mexico.78
CMPort at Miami (South Florida Container Terminal). This terminal is a joint 
venture between Terminal Link (51 percent) and A.P. Moller–Maersk Terminals 
(49 percent), again giving CMPort a roughly 25 percent equity stake in the rev-
enues from the terminal. As in Houston, this is a modern, upgraded facility with 
access to major U.S. and Latin American markets.
The Wider Context
The commercial motivations underlying these two firms’ entry into the U.S. 
market are not difficult to grasp. The potential security externalities from the 
presence of Chinese SOEs at critical U.S. infrastructure, however, are worth con-
sidering—and indeed, senior U.S. policy makers have considered them, through 
the CFIUS mechanism. While there is not public reporting on each deal that 
this interagency body reviews, parties involved with submitting CFIUS briefs for 
COSCO and CMPort confirm that all their transactions concerning U.S. port 
terminals have been reviewed and conditions have been placed on the terms of 
their ownership.79 The CMPort disclosure on its 2013 share acquisition noted 
that CFIUS approval was still in question, but that contingency agreements had 
been reached to remove the Houston and Miami terminals from the agreement 
if CFIUS was not satisfied by the closing date.80
Since its failed 1996 bid to lease the former Navy facility at Long Beach, 
COSCO has been chastened in its approach to the U.S. market.81 Beginning in 
2017, COSCO sought to acquire the Hong Kong shipping firm Orient Overseas 
16
Naval War College Review, Vol. 74 [2021], No. 1, Art. 11
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol74/iss1/11
 1 4 4  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
(International) Limited, whose assets included a wholly owned terminal at Long 
Beach.82 COSCO submitted the transaction for antimonopoly review in China 
and the United States, and also filed with CFIUS. In its consultations with CFIUS 
COSCO was conciliatory, offering to place the Long Beach Container Terminal 
(Pier E) at the Port of Long Beach into a U.S. trust pending final sale.83 This facil-
ity was a rare prize: fully automated, with extraordinary efficiency in use, zero 
emissions, and 100 percent ownership by a foreign firm on a long-term lease.84 
COSCO completed the sale in 2019 to an Australian firm, Macquarie, for $1.78 
billion, exceeding the expected sale price of $1.5 billion.85
Moving forward, any further Chinese interest in U.S. terminals will face an 
even more stringent regulatory environment. The CFIUS mechanism has been 
strengthened considerably, with new FIRRMA regulations entering into ef-
fect in 2020.86 They bring about a significant expansion of CFIUS jurisdiction 
over real estate transactions, detailed in section 802. In addition to covering all 
real estate transactions that involve property in proximity to military facilities, 
the new regulations cover real estate transactions at any of the top twenty-five 
ports in the United States and those designated “commercial strategic seaport[s] 
within the National Port Readiness Network” (as defined by the Department 
of Transportation).87 The regulations also establish a lower threshold to trigger 
CFIUS scrutiny when a foreign entity is judged to “control” a U.S. business.88 Ac-
cording to Proskauer Rose LLP, a U.S. law firm, special attention must be paid 
in structuring joint ventures such that foreign partners do not receive “control” 
rights that will trigger CFIUS review.89 Given these expanded authorities and the 
increased political sensitivity to Chinese investment in the United States, it is 
highly unlikely that a Chinese firm will win a concession to operate a U.S. port in 
the foreseeable future, thus mitigating most (if not all) the risks analyzed earlier 
in this testimony.
While it is premature to claim that PLA logistics arrangements overseas rely on 
PRC firms, there is a growing body of evidence that the commercial facilities 
owned or operated by those firms are a key component of Chinese efforts to 
project power abroad. A few further implications and recommendations flow 
from this conclusion.
Over the long term, PLA planners believe they will require a network of 
overseas bases.90 For the short to medium term, however, the dual-use strategic 
strongpoint model is ascendant. This model provides significant peacetime logis-
tics capability and intelligence value. However, unless and until China establishes 
alliances or security agreements that ensure reliable military access in a conflict, 
the wartime utility of these facilities will be limited.
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Properly equipped and used, commercial ports may perform valuable military 
functions—not only for logistics, but for intelligence and communications—that 
do not require establishment of formal PLA facilities and permissions. Further 
research and analysis of the characteristics of China’s commercial port facilities 
and activities is necessary.
Economic influence is the leading instrument of Chinese efforts to achieve se-
curity abroad. The Chinese firms building and operating infrastructure overseas 
are on the front lines of the nascent great-power competition. There is no viable 
method of preventing their commercial entry into most foreign markets. U.S. 
failure to roll back the concession won by Shanghai International Port Group at 
the Port of Haifa in Israel should be a cautionary tale.91 If a close security partner 
such as Israel is not persuaded that the security risks outweigh the commercial 
benefits, it is highly improbable that other states will forgo Chinese involvement 
in their critical infrastructure.92
Neither U.S. firms nor the U.S. government is prepared to offer direct substi-
tutes for Chinese firms building, financing, or operating ports and other trans-
port infrastructure. More useful than insisting that other states refuse Chinese 
largesse is empowering them to exploit it. U.S. firms and government agencies 
could provide anticipatory consultation with governments and businesses engag-
ing with PRC firms on port projects, providing legal and managerial advice on 
how best to retain control over important operational elements and rights to their 
infrastructure. Helping other states maintain open bidding and nondiscrimina-
tory commercial access to Chinese projects will limit prospective harms to U.S. 
national security.
Given the number and geographic distribution of ports under full or partial 
PRC ownership and operational control, all regional combatant commanders 
should be tasked to specify to the Secretary of Defense which ports are essential 
to U.S. joint forces in carrying out assigned missions in their areas of respon-
sibility. When there are Chinese facilities at these ports, robust risk-mitigation 
measures must be adopted.
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